In a recent Supreme Court ruling, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the majority opinion about campaign finance reform and restriction, “Enough is enough.” On June 25, the High Court seemingly reversed large precedent, reversing the restrictions of McCain-Feingold (2002), as wells as the McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003) ruling that upheld McCain-Feingold. Implemented to regulate donations and expenditures of “soft money,” along with issue advocacy electioneering, these former standards now contend with the recent 5-4 conservative majority.
Coupled with this, the High Court also issued another heavy-handed ruling in early May 2009. In regards to West Virginia state Supreme Court Justice Brent Benjamin, the SCOTUS held that Benjamin must recuse himself from a very contentious case involving a party that donated over $3 million to his campaign efforts. Did the contributor have a right to donate, regardless of intent? Did Benjamin have a right to accept the funds, and could he control their allocation? Did the United States Supreme Court have a right to censor Benjamin and remand the case, mandating his recusal? In the span of one month, the issue of campaign finance emerged vigorously and caused much debate about who donates, how much, to whom, and when contribution should take place.
Several forces are at play during this debate, which generate much interest. As the executive and legislative branches slide farther to the left, and a liberal appointee waits for the nod for her spot on the bench, the Supreme Court’s conservative wing is causing some uncertainty as to future rulings by the Supreme Court. Second, campaign finance laws could change drastically for all political races, on state and federal levels. Third, the historical right to free speech in America through campaign contribution seems to be under fire from an “almost-majority” on the Supreme Court, and certainly in other branches of government. Successful reversal of said campaign finance restrictions, and implementation of campaign contribution freedoms, would certainly spill into other arenas and promote “right sizing” government through sweeping de-regulation in other areas. Our goal should be to evaluate these current events, site applicable legislation and case law, and propose efficient, effective reforms to protect the liberties of contributors and campaigners in the American election system.
For West Virginia judicial selection, the issue is even more applicable. In The Rule of Law, writers discuss possible reforms for the current elective system that remains highly partisan. Many of these writers argue that the current system, as it stands, hurts the business climate within West Virginia, because employers have little trust in the stability of the state's legal system (especially with a rogue Attorney General). Possible reforms include non-partisan elections or merit-based appointments, similar to the federal selection process. Additionally, public financing proposals are put forth as probable ingredients for a more transparent selection process. Whatever the solution, candidate dialogue must be protected and expanded through the selection processes for all offices. This will ensure that voters have to opportunity to ask questions and receive quality answers in pursuit of finding the truth about the individuals seeking office.
